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American Poets from tbe Puritans to the Present by Hyatt H. Waggoner. Bos-
ton: Houghton Mifflin, 1968. Pp. xxi + 740. $8.50. 
This is a fighting book, a polemical history of American verse. Its purpose is 
to reclaim our poetry from the dominance of the Modernist movement organized 
by Pound and Eliot, which, 1\1r. Waggoner feels, has, through the influence of 
its poets and their admiring critics, all but submerged the genuine American 
tradition based on the philosophy of Emerson. As a result we nowadays don't 
even read Qur nineteenth century poets aright, nor do we recognize the real 
lineage of our best poets. 
As onc who long has felt that the center of gravity in American poetry is 
surely Emerson's essay. "The Poct," I'm prepared to go along with that. Yet 
I find I can't keep Mr. Waggoner's argument company all the way. Hyatt Wag-
goner, who has written one of the most sensitive and comprehending studies of 
Hawthorne which that much-maligned author has received, is the author also of 
an earlier study of modern poets. I confess not to have read The Heel of Elobim, 
but would cite its subtitle as indicative of one of Mr. Waggoner's abiding 
interests and as a clue to his method of approaching poetry. He calls his earlier 
book Science and Values in Modern American Poetry. Now, relying heavily on 
W. T. Stace's Religion and the Modern World, Mr. Waggoner mounts a counter-
attack against the incorporation, as it seems, of scientific assumptions into the 
methods and attitudes of poetry. Poets nowadays seem guilty of what Emerson 
deplored in his contemporaries: "Men seem to have lost the perception of the 
instant dependence of form upon soul" (an apothegm of RWE's which Mr. 
Waggoner does not quote). l\10dern poets who have tried to replace transcen-
dental affirmation with objectivism, imagism, or any other means of dealing 
with" No ideas but in things" seem to Mr. Waggoner to have traduced poetry 
from its necessary humanism and to have reduced it to a mechanistic craft. 
His own center of certitude leads Mr. Waggoner to provide a full-scale 
scholarly justification for the recent movements in modern poetry which disavow 
the Elder Statesmen. It leads him also to revise the usual estimate of priorities 
and accomplishments in the earlier centuries of the meager annals of American 
verse. For Mr. Waggoner is so solidly in the transcendentalist camp that he 
does not view with sympathy the Puritan belief against which Emerson & Co. 
rebelled. If Ann Bradstreet and Edward Taylor could believe in Puritanism, so 
much the worse for them. Mr. Waggoner finds Puritan theology inhuman and 
pathological. Who in his right mind would accept such tenets as infant damna-
tion and the election only of a few chosen aforetimes by a God too brutal to 
let us know His will? Analyzing the much-praised metaphysical strain in Taylor'S 
poems, Mr. Waggoner finds our Puritan poet, with his metaphors mixed and 
self-contradicting, a poor pupil of George Herbert, "hardly worth reading l) 
except as an anticipator of Emerson. 
The chapter on the five New England greybeards will not tempt anyone to 
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delve into Bryant, Holmes Of Longfellow (whose sonnets don't rate mention), 
but Mr. vVaggoner makes a case, among Lowell's many prolix and ambitious 
failures, for" Fitz-Adam's Story," and argues convincingly in favor of Whittier's 
"Snowbound." He rightly concludes that these once-revered worthies "failed 
by the tests provided in Emerson's 'The Poet ': America was not a poem in 
their eyes." 
Emerson's seminal value is found to reside in his "thought," particularly in 
"The Poet" and in "Circles." By page 94 we come close to the heart, or 
jugular vein, of Mr. Waggoner's argument: 
What are the typical American poems? ... there would at least be 
nothing essentially misleading in naming as typical "Uriel," "Song of 
J\1yself," Dicldnson's « Like Rain it Sounded Till it Curved," "The Man 
Against the Sky," "Kitty Hawk," "Sunday Morning," and "The 
Bridge." What they have in common .•. despite their stylistic and 
formal differences, is that none of them can be understood except in 
religious terms. They are all eschatological poems. 
Wr. Waggoner asserts that the chief difference between American and British 
poetry is "that American poets have tended to think of poetry as prophecy, not 
as the practice of an art whose rules were known, and not as a way of thinking 
about a fixed and known' reality.'" (p. 85.) TIns sentiment might surprise Blake 
or Shelley or Yeats, but they are of course the British founders of the symbolist 
movement whose prophecies invoke other religions than the Emersonian. Whit-
man, who thought of Leaves of Grass as "essentially a language experiment" 
(among his other ways of thinking of it) is here discussed as thinker rather than 
as poet. There are valuable chapters on the Emersonian strains in the poems of 
Thoreau and Dickinson, but the claims made for i\1:elville's verse by Matthiessen 
and Parrell (Mr. Waggoner does not mention Robert Penn Warren) seem" a 
judgment chiefly valuable for the way it illustrates the occasional fallibility of 
even the finest critics." This judgment is substantiated by a few pages on the 
flatness of Clare!; but surely if there were one poem written in the American 
nineteenth century which speaks with painful clarity of our condition now it is 
Melville's "The House-Top." \Vhich 1\Ilr. Waggoner doesn't mention, nor 
would he probably agree with either my high evaluation or Melville's pessemistic 
view of an American city torn by civil strife "In code corroborating Calvin's 
creed." 
If the foregoing summary of Mr. Waggoner's argument has perpetrated no 
serious distortion of his views, several inferences may be drawn from my account 
of the first half of his book. First, it will be seen that the center of power in 
Tbe American Poets is Emerson as a religious thinker. Those poets who failed 
to anticipate or to carryon Emerson's tradition of insight into the spiritual core 
of life, of which nature is the continuing revelation, are knocked down from 
the plinths and pedestals to which less transcendental readers have assigned them. 
Thus I construe the emphasis on the article in The American Poets. 
Second, this is a one-tradition book, and that tradition is American. There's 
no systematic or extended comparison of our nineteenth-century poets with 
their Romantic or Victorian contemporaries. A not fully articulated premise 
is that the internationalism of Pound and Eliot is a negligible contribution to 
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Tbe American tradition which Mr. Waggoner upholds, although it had been 
predicted by Bryant in 1825, who maintained that American poets, unburdened 
by the weight of their own national traditions, would freely adopt and adapt 
the myths, legends, and conventions of the literatures of other lands (" On 
Poetry in Its Relation to OUI Age and Country"). 
And finally, The American Poets is more concerned with Poets than with 
poems, more with their attitude to life than with the ways those attitudes are 
enacted into poetry. This is a heartily Emersonian bias, regarding the Poet as 
Seer and Sayer rather than as a Maker. Consequently Mr. Waggoner can find 
evidence just as useful for his inquiry in poems of slight merit as in master-
pieces. Indeed works artistically defective may prove more useful to such an 
investigation, laying bare, as they do, the assumptions on which they are made. 
Mr. Waggoner, while valuably directing us to read Emerson's rarely reprinted 
early poems, can compare to Frost's "Sand Dunes" and to Eliot's "Dry Sal-
vages" so banal a poem as Emerson's "Water"-he calls it "interesting and 
memorable," but I find it hard to take seriously a poem on a serious subject 
which uses such dull light rhymes as "It wets my foot but prettily, I It chills 
my life, but wittily," or which migles conversational verb forms with" decketh," 
"adorneth, doubleth," and chimes cliche with cliche. The Whitman chapter 
rests on an exegesis of "To Think of Time," a poem which, Mr. Waggoner 
admits, "no one else has ever claimed as one of VVhitman's best, though it seems 
to me so, because parts of it put so baldly the rationale of Whitman's celebration 
of the self, himself and every self, and of life in all its variety and promise" 
(p. 168). This would be defensible were there no such evidence available in a 
dozen, a score of other poems such as "Song of Myself," "The Sleepers," etc., 
etc., whose expression is intrinsic with their thought. Mr. Waggoner's critical 
method would seem to detect little, if any, difference in content between the 
poem that succeeds and the poem that fails. To critics of a:p.other persuasion, 
however, as to many of the poets whose work is here discussed, form, rhythm, 
diction, and tone are equally as important as subject and metaphor in determin-
ing-indeed, in predicating-any II meaning" which may be paraphrased from the 
total poetic statement. Such terms as the foregoing, though are not the usual 
ones in Mr. Waggoner's critical canon; the shot and powder with which he is 
armed more usually comes from terms like "eschatalogical vision," 41 teleology," 
and "scientificism." 
Curiously, I find myself thinking of another critic whose eccentricities of taste 
Mr. Waggoner rightly deplores. Like Yvor Winters, Hyatt Waggoner is a 
moralist. Therefore the verse and criticism of those who, like Poe, propose that 
the poem has no other end than its own perfection, or-less dogmatically-that 
aesthetic standards must determine the relevance of aesthetic works, seem to 
him either trivial or mischievous. Although committed to an entirely different 
aesthetic, The American Poets is in its monism comparable also to another earlier 
study of American writing; like Parrington's Main Currents of American 
Thought, the present book excludes currents not deemed to be in the mainstream. 
Which, as Lionel Trilling made clear about Parrington, leads to claims too large, 
one-sided, and unconte§ited. The whole symbolist tradition is missing from Mr. 
Waggoner's view, although a good case has been made by Charles FeideIson 
(among others) for Emerson's relevance to that tradition in America. Rejected 
is not only Poe's aesthetic, which demanded the repudiation of reality in order 
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to provide in its stead the created reality of the imagination, but also the more 
humane and inclusive idealism of Santayana (scarcely mentioned) 1 who proposed 
that all of reality is the material upon which "the significant imagination" 
performs its work of analytical transformation. 
Fully half of this book deals with poetry since 1912. Mr. Waggoner dis-
covers in Imagism the great betrayal of the Transcendentalist-Romantic move-
ment. "Imagism," he says, "grew out of scientific positivism" (p. 336). 
The idea of man implicit in such poetic theory is the materialist one 
that he is like the Pavlovian dog ,,,hose mouth waters when a bell rings. 
Whether we call Imagist-Impersonal poetic theory "Bchavorist" or 
"mechanist-materialist" or "positivist," it is clear that this earlier poetics 
of Modernism was not philosophically neutral. ... 
Imagism was the first phase of a literary moyement characterized ulti-
mately by themes of alienation, by insistence on denial of responsibility, 
by the preference for the "anti-hero "-Prufrock, Senlin-ano finally, 
when philosophy and theology, as popularly known, had caught up with 
Pound's early poetics, by despair and emptiness. Imagism is the poetic 
equivalent of fictional naturalism. (Pages 339-40.) 
"Behavorist"? "Positivism"? "Naturalism"? Do these pejorations really 
describe the poetics that produced H. D.'s little poem about the shapes of pears? 
The true center of Mr. \Vaggoncr's animus against Imagism is not so much these 
pseudo-scientific asseverations made by some of the Imagists but "themes of 
alienation ... denial of responsibility ... despair and emptiness." NIr. Waggoner 
repudiates not only the poetics of the Modernist movement but the breaking 
do\vn in our culture of all the cenainties which Emerson proposed a century 
ago. Yet in proposing them, Emerson found he had to strip away the dead 
husks, the encrustation of custom by which society kept each man from recog-
nizing the sources of his o\vn manhood. Fighting the old battlc of the religious 
sensibility against the menace of scientific positivism, .Mr. Waggoner seems to 
me to regard as agents of the enemy many of the poets who in fact demonstrate 
the continuing resilience of Emerson's radical indiyidualism. 
Who, after all, does belong under Emerson's banner? Suppose we consider 
Emerson not only as a Seer with an "eschatological vision" but also as a 
theorist for the Makers. Suppose we place RWE at the center of a somewhat 
different circle from the one which Mr. Waggoner draws around the body of 
his beliefs. For in "The Pact" and in the section on language in "Nature," 
Emerson utters the American counterpan to the call sounded forty years earlier 
in The LY1'ical Ballads to rescue the diction and the forms of poetry from 
mechanism, cliche, stale habit. This is the ongoing renewal of the art which 
must be made in each generation, by each poet, lest the forms and language of 
verse become no longer capable of expressing or eliciting the actual responses of 
men: exactly the condition of poetry around 1910, as it was in Emerson's and 
Whitman's day. 
When Walt admitted that it was Emerson who brought his seethings to a 
boil, what his turbulent chowder-kettle contained was not only a form of 
Emerson's philosophy transmogrified into his own, but the sudden imaginative 
capacity to enact in poems Emerson's philosophy of form. Why it was that 
Emerson the poet is S9 little the achiever of what Emerson the Seer predicated 
1-
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for the poet to do is one of the mysteries at the center of the ever-revolving 
circles of Emerson's being. Was it the inbred constraint of his Puritan-Unitarian 
heritage? Or an inescapable fealty to genteel conventions associated with the 
High Calling of the Seer? Somehow, despite the radical and seminal nature of 
his thought, in the diction and form of most of his poems Emerson lacked the 
afflatus to become the Litcratus which his O\Vll philosophy of emancipation from 
tradition in fact demanded. His disciple is Walt the plebe, the queer, the 
poseur, "one of the toughs, of lVIanahatta the son," a nonconformist by birth-
right, repudiating America's norms but best expressing her hitherto unsung hopes. 
What a strange enactment of Emerson's lofty prophecies. 
But from Whitman's unconstraint came the radical breakup of form and 
meter, the true discovery of how to use the vernacular diction in poetry (antici-
pated by R\VE in the first part of "Hamatreya," alas an anomaly among his 
"wer'ts" and" dosts"). What is more, Whitman discovered too how to recon-
stitute in organic forms the obsolete kinds of form he repudiated. In his steps 
I'd place Ezra, who indeed made "A Pact" with Whitman, and the whole 
experimental tradition of Modernism. The same fire brought their seethings to a 
boil. 1. e.: Cummings, whose attitude to life Mr. Waggoner valuably elucidates 
as Emersonian, is Emersonian too in his radical linguistic pri~nitivism-his rejec-
tion of conventional encrustations of meaning attached to the very forms and 
meters of verse, the very words of the language-and in his need to reconstitute 
a language directly in contact with experience. 
That need is the essential motive of the entire Modernist movement: the need 
for emotional honesty, for the proofs of being in direct touch with life, as ex-
pressed in diction, forms, rhythms intrinsic with what is experienced; a rejection 
of that part of the past which like a shell on our backs keeps OUt the realities 
we might otherwise feel and say. If Pound and Eliot adopted a mechanistic 
vocabulary and called for poetry to be as well-written as prose, it was because 
the poetry of the time was loosely ill-written, and science could be invoked 
polemically as a call-really, a recall-to accuracy of observation. Williams' 
slogan, "No ideas but in things," does not mean no ideas at all, as Mr. Waggoner 
seems to infer, but suggests that things do represent ideas. What else could 
Pound have been thinking of in his famous definition of an image as "that 
which presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time"? 
"The natural object," Pound added, "is always the adequate symbol. Go in fear 
of abstractions." If only Pound had done so, in matters historical, economic, 
and political! As for the Imagism which Pound helped to define, Mr. Waggoner 
regards as the arch-enemy of idealism a brief movement which was in fact a 
stage in the development of technique, shared for a few years by poets as dis-
parate as Pound, Eliot, H. D., Williams, Stevens, and Marianne Moore. Mr. Wag-
goner seems to me to quite misread the true temper of Marianne Moore's poetry, 
for he parses her one poem "Poetry" and finds her "positivistic and anti-
idealistic." Yet who is more Emersonian in her rectitude and emotional honesty? 
It seems a mistake to deny "any cognitive function to the imagination" in the 
work of the poet who has given us our most believable and ethically valid modern 
bestiary, who praised "Spenser's Ireland," "A Carriage Built in Sweden," and 
wrote "The mind is an enchanting thing." Each of the Imagists learned from 
Imagism to write economically, to control rhythms freed from formal meters, 
to organize perceptions without stuffing them into predetermined fODDs. Isn't 
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this the organic form of the meter-making argument for which Emerson sounded 
his noble trumpet eighty years earlier? These lessons learned, each quondam 
Imagist went his own way. To hold that these poets deprived modern literature 
of the quest for spiritual meaning seems to me to misconstrue their individual 
voyages after strange gods as well as back to the familiar. 
In his preface Mr. Waggoner disarmingly confesses that as his book pro-
grammed itself it required that he relinquish the chance to comment on some 
of his favorite poets-among whom I am glad indeed to find my own name 
mentioned. Yet some of the omissions arc surprising. Of all contemporary poets 
the one whose work would seem best to demonstrate the Emersoruan position, 
with all its risks and strengths, is Richard Eberhart; yet he too is among the 
regretted exclusions. In fact as the historical survey comes down to our own 
rime, the tradition here seems spotty and idiosyncratic. The last chapter, "After 
Modernism," briefly discusses Roethke (very perceptively), Lowell, Shapiro, and 
Wilbur-the masters of the middle generation; and still briefer comment on 
James Dickey, Howard Nemerov, Robert Kelley (in two contexts), Robert 
Duncan, Denise Levertov, Robert Creeley. In a work of over 700 pages, which 
gives space to Sara Teasdalc, Elinore Wylie, James Gould Fletcher and Amy 
Lowell, there is no mention made of such significant contemporaries as John 
Berryman, Charles Olson, Allen Ginsberg, W. S. Merwin, Anthony Hecht. 
"The price I have paid for trying to illuminate the main lines of the develop-
ment of American poetry by concentrating on lengthy treatment of 'representa-
tive poets,''' Mr. Waggoner writes, "is in not being able to talk about some of 
the poetry that means most to me personally. But perhaps another time, 
another book." Let's hope so. For Hyatt Waggoner, however much I have 
differed w.ith his emphasis and approach, is a concerned advocate of our litera-
ture who writes with vigor and passion out of his own convictions. I am grateful 
for a book which so energetically arraigns the acceptance of the Modernist 
masters and so sternly argues for virtues long out of fashion. Whether we agree 
with Mr. Waggoner or not, The American Poets compels us thoughtfully to 
reconsider our poetic heritage. This is a considerable accomplishment. 
DANIEL HOFFMAN 
University of Pennsylvania 
Gerard Manley Hopkins: The Poet as Victorian by Wendell Stacy Johnson. 
Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1968. Pp. xii + 178. $6.95. 
Although the dates of his birth and death-1844-1889-fall within the Victorian 
period, the predominant attitude of critics toward Hopkins aftcr the first edition 
of his poems in 1918 was that he was almost completely non-Victorian. They 
tended to see Hopkins either as one of their own contemporaries in the fore-
front of modern poetry or as a throwback to some pre-Chaucerian era. 
It was not until the centenary of his birth in 1944 that Arthur Mizener con-
tributed to the Kenyon symposium an essay entitled "Victorian Hopkins," and 
that Austin Warren suggested his roots in nineteenth century England. W. H. 
BOOK REVIEws 303 
Gardner's two-volume study, written about the same time, attempted to find a. 
balance which is suggested by its subtide, Gerard Mlmley Hopkins: A Study of 
Poetic Idiosyncrasy in Relation to Poetic Tradition. 
Some recent criticism has emphasized nineteenth century aspects of Hopkins. 
Todd K. Bender in his Gerard Mlmley Hopkins: The Classical Background and 
Critical Reception of His Work (The Johus Hopkins Press, 1966) has con· 
tended that many of Hopldns' methods had their origin in his training as a 
19th century classical scholar. And Elisabetb Schneider in an article in PMLA 
(1965), recendy revised as a chapter in her The Dragon in the Gate: Studies 
in the Poetry of G. M. Hopkins (University of California Press, 1968), has related 
his sprung rhythm to Victorian prosodic and metrical experiments. 
However, Wendell Stacy Johnson, convinced that one of the most significant 
contexts of Hopkins' art is Victorian, has contributed an entirely new and fresh 
approach to the examination of Hopkins as a poet of his time. 
This he does by attempting a new definition or description of the very term 
"Victorian." Rejecting previous formulations as relatively superficial (i. e. 
imperialism, hypocricy, optimism, etc.) he seeks to find the essence of Victorian-
ism as differentiated both from Romanticism and from the spirit of the twentieth 
century. 
The paradoxical unity of Victorianism, he holds, lies fundamentally in a feel· 
ing of intense self-consciousness, of almost simultaneous self-probing and self-
masking, and in a newly ambivalent relationship of that self-consciousness to 
nature, a new relation of ego and image or of self and nature embodied in the 
writer's imagery. Within the Victorian intelligence and sensibility there is im-
plied an uneasy duality, irony, and doubt, an anxious mood of introspection and 
uncertainty, a condition characterized by Arnold as the II dialogue of the mind 
with itself." A result is an alienation of the artist not only from society but 
from himself. 
This Victorian self-consciousness is different, Johnson suggests, from that 
of the Romantics who attained an hannonious interaction with nature and from 
that of the modems who, instead of trying to discover themselves, try "to create 
themselves." 
Hopkins' emphasis on inscape, then, is his effort to come to terms with 
this self-consciousness by controlling doubleness and ambiguity. From this point 
of view Hopkins is preoccupied with the post-Romantic problems which haunt 
Victorian writers as he probes the relation-or alienation-of self and external 
nature. 
Mter this prelude, the balance of the book is devoted to examining the 
imagery of four (thougb many others are treated incidentally) centrally impor-
tant poems by Hopkins that explore the relation of self to nature. 
"The Wreck of the Deutschland," combining introspective manner with dra-
matic matter, is seen as opposing active nature to self. At the center is an am-
bivalent response in which the sea of death is the sea of life and death is a 
means to a fuller life. 
II The Windhover" develops a parallel between active nature and self. In-
viting ambivalent responses, the arch-pattern of self is revealed through self-
sacrifice. 
The third poem treated is "Spring and Fall" where the parallel is between 
passive nature and self and where Johnson also deals with the Victorian con-
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sciOllsness of time, a subject recendy explored by Jerome H. Buckley (The 
Triumph of Time, Cambridge, Mass., 1966). In "Spring and Fall" the child of 
the Romantics has become more victim than visionary. 
Finally, "That Nature is a Heraclitean Fire," opposing passive nature to 
transfiguration, asserts human immortality by shifting from a natural imagery 
of brilliant light to a metaphorical imagery of transcendent light. The poem 
is the climax of the dappled imagery of light and darkness or the simultaneous 
perception of night and day ubiquitous in Hopkins. 
Haplrins' response in the body of his work to questions about man and 
nature makes him Victorian. In spite of paradoxical complexities and ambigui-
ties, Johnson finds him more coherent and consistent than other Victorians. The 
range of his experience and thought may be limited but Johnson concludes 
that It his art is as intense as it is narrow or concentrated." 
It always seems niggling for a reviewer to collect proof errors, and such 
oversights in the book as that of referring to the windhover who "makes an 
are" are not disturbing. One is more perturbed when slips appear in supporting 
quotations from Hopkins as when" my taste was me" becomes II my taste [be} 
rue," or when" shipwrack" in "The Wreck of the Deutschland" becomes" ship-
wreck," or when "havens" in "Heaven-Haven" becomes II heavens." And 
one doubts whether the rhythm and sense are improved by dropping Hopkins' 
markings in "Margaret" in II Spring and Fall" and by deleting the diacritical 
mark in "hoiirs" in one of the Dublin sonnets. 
As one looks back over the book one realizes that Johnson will be subject to 
attack on two major fronts. 
Many a scholar will challenge his definition of Victorianism as either too 
broad or too narrow. If it is too broad it is because it can be manipulated to 
include many writers or works that no one has ever thought-or even would 
think of-as Victorian. On the other hand, if it is too narrow it excludes many 
characteristics that differentiate Victorian writers from those of other periods. 
Eventually the only way it can be tested is by careful application to all the 
works of all the Victorians, and this would take a whole generation of scholars. 
Certainly with Hopkins it works much better with some poems than with 
others, and one cannot help admiring Johnson for choosing not to take the easy 
way out by concentrating on the Dublin sonnets which are probably the best 
illustration of his thesis. With the poems which he does treat he handles his 
definition with sophistication and-in spite of some straining-with a great deal 
of wide-ranging flexibility. As I interpret him, he does not mean to deny that 
in Hopkins there are other (though he would say more superficial) Victorian 
elements nor that there are aspects in which Hopkins is something other than 
a Victorian. What he has found in Hopkins is at least one dimension that is 
undoubtedly present at the center of his work and that helps to relate him to at 
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Tragedy and Melodrama: Versions of Experience by Robert Bechtold Heilman. 
Seatde: University of Washington Press, 1968. Pp. xiii + 326. $8.95. 
R. B. Heilman's handsome new volume, obviously the product of many years 
of study and deliberation, may well be among the most important contributions 
to the critical theory of dramatic literature to appear in our time; it is certainly 
one which future writers in this field will find it impossible to ignore. The author 
is exceedingly modest. He calls his work an "essay," an attempt simply to 
explore ideas rather than to enunciate principles. Actually, he has set out to 
define more precisely than ever before the genres of tragedy and melodrama. 
He has not, however, limited himself to literature, for he is concerned with 
defining the tragic and melodramatic perspectives as two complementary and 
ever present ways in which human beings always have examined the experience 
of life, whether they be dramatists or not. 
Tragedy as a literary genre Heilman would separate with finality from the 
ordinary use of the term as a description of human disaster; melodrama he 
would re-establish as a critical concept without derogatory implications, de-
scribing a wide range of non-tragic literature, including the literature of 
disaster which has often been confused with tragedy, capable of expressing 
triumph as well as despair, and offering a vehicle for the highest kind of artistic 
expression. Tragedy and melodrama he sees as each fulfilling basic human needs, 
each with a validity distinctly its own, and he would oppose the critical ten-
dency to confuse the properties of the two, for "if the former [tragedy] has 
been cheapened by being applied where the latter [melodrama] is fitting, both 
have been debased by being used for much less exacting experiences than 
those which they properly denote and for which we lack other terms" (p. 286). 
To demonstrate the many facets of each of these genres Heilman ranges over 
all of the world's dramatic literature, and he draws upon the novel as well. 
It is impossible in a brief review to do justice to the range and complexity of 
his arguments; but, in brief, Heilman sees the essential difference between 
tragedy and melodrama in the nature of their protagonists. Tragedy is marked by 
U division" in the character of the hero, and melodrama by "wholeness." 
Whether melodrama end in triumph or in death, its essential structure calls for 
a self-sufficient, unified force pitted against some kind of obstacle which it may 
overcome or by which it may be destroyed. Man may struggle against nature, 
society, evil political institutions, other evil men, or even against elements within 
himself. One of the highest achievements of melodrama Heilman sees as 
Webster's Duchess of Malji, which he describes as a play about a force of pure 
innocence, without inner conflict, destroyed by pure malignancy-a play of un-
mitigated disaster, but not a tragedy because the Duchess has had no share in 
her own destruction. 
Melodrama involves no difficult choices for the hero, and it need not reveal 
suffering as accompanied by growth in knowledge or understanding. Tragedy, 
on the other hand, must have an intelligent hero who is forced to choose benveen 
alternative commitments, but no choice that he is capable of making can at the 
same time both resolve his problems and insure his moral fullness as a human 
being; he cannot achieve felicity without losing some element of his manhood, 
although that choice is always open to him: Hamlet might have decided to 
forget about his father and accept the good life under Claudius, or Cordelia 
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might have chosen to sacrifice her own integrity so as to humor her foolish 
father. The destruction of such a tragic hero is accompanied by his acquisition of 
new insight into his own nature as a human being and into the universal human 
condition. "Every tragic choice," writes Heilman, "is both an affirmation of 
self and a suicide" (p. 15), and the human condition can never be a subject 
for despair. Tragedy is essentially optimistic because "in tragedy, life may Of 
may not be cut off, but death, if it comes, is a lesser event than the new growth 
of the hero" (p. 154). 
In making this crucial point Heilman has performed an especially valuable 
service at this time, for the tendency to equate tragedy with a despairing view 
of mankind has been a growing feature of recent dramatic criticism, especially 
of Shakespeare. King Lear, for instance, has been seen as a. play about impotent 
humanity suffering at the hands of brutal and capricious forces in a universe 
without reason or order. For Heilman the play is a much more complex 
experience in which, while we pity Lear in his suffering and are profoundly 
moved by the horror which can so afHict a. fellow human being, "we do not 
forget that Lear, under the dominion of the dark side of his being, has created 
the storm himself. Profound pity for Lear as victim, yes, but also acknowledg-
ment of the paradoxical presence of justice, and sense of irony-all are present 
in a disturbing polypathic experience" (p. 89). Any play which depicts man 
as the victim of incomprehensible external forces-and notably the "naturalistic 
tragedy" of recent times-Heilman would call melodrama and not tragedy at 
all. 'I Tragedy," he writes, "implies a kind of recovery. Tragedy is the idiom of 
an imperfect humanity that remains capable of moral recuperation; tragedy 
implies a durable order of life, in which failure is always possible, but in which 
it is understood, not mistaken for a final blow, the road to nothing. In tragedy 
there is spiritual survival" (p. 154). 
Heilman argues that when an artist faced with a story of human suffering 
treats it from the viewpoint of the doer of evil he writes tragedy, but when he 
treats it from the viewpoint of the victim of evil he writes melodrama. The 
tragic perspective is thus a difficult and painful one, for it forces us to look for 
the sources of evil within ourselves, and it calls for the exercise of all of our 
powers of self analysis. The melodramatic perspective is easier and more natural, 
for it allows us to assert our entire beings in opposition to external forces. It is 
a complementary kind of experience to the tragic, and both must be experi-
enced by the full man. 
Heilman thus establishes the crucial importance of melodrama in all human 
experience, and he extends its range far beyond what most of us have habitually 
understood by the term. He makes the dramatic genre include such plays as 
Miller's Deatb of a Salesman, O'Neill's Long Day's Journey Into Night, virtually 
all drama of social, economic, or political protest, and what many of us have long 
considered to be among the greatest of Elizabethan and Jacobean tragedies: 
Edward II, The Spanish Tragedy, Bussy D'Ambois, Tbe Revenger's Tragedy, 
Tbe Wbite Devil, Tbe Cbangeling, 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, although he admits 
that some of these contain elements which border closely upon the tragic. It is 
here that the strongest objection may be taken by some readers, for in this 
extension of melodrama there is a diminishing of the possibilities of tragedy 
which may be disturbing. 
Even on the basis of Heilman's own criteria, it is possible to argue that The 
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Duchess of Malfi, for instance, is not melodrama but tragedy. The Duchess is 
faced with a choice between her natural human love for Antonio and the moral 
and social imperative that she not marry beneath her social station. Tllls is a 
division not essentially different from that of a Hamlet torn by the human 
impulse to avenge his father in opposition to the divine injunction against such 
conduct, or that of a Faustus whose human need to pursue forbidden Imowledge 
runs counter to the threat of damnation. The social context of the Duchess' 
defiance of her brothers-a major issue in the play's source-is not considered by 
Heihnan so fully as it is by other critics (M. C. Bradbrook, for instance), who 
see her as a less innocent figure. If she, like Lear, brings evil upon herself by 
her own choice, she also grows in the same manner under the pressure of 
disaster, and she attains a kind of victory in spite of death which affirms the 
greatness of the human spirit and thus rescues the play from despair. If the 
tragic experience leads to a heightened awareness of the potentialities of man-
kind, this is certainly achieved in The Duchess of Malfi. In the heroine's choice 
of suffering and death rather than renunciation of her full humanity there is a 
heroic quality which is also an ingredient of tragedy, and to which Heilman 
pays too little attention. 
Heilman's generic distinctions are highly speculative, and they will doubtless 
be the subject of considerable debate (nor is it likely that he would expect 
or wish the situation to be othenvisc). Tragedy has meant different things 
to different people in different ages, and to different individuals within the same 
historical period. Heilman is not concerned with historical development, although 
he does devote one hrge chapter to measuring his definitions within the historical 
context of English Renaissance drama. But in determining what tragedy is, can 
we ignore what tragedy has been? Heilman calls Ben Jonson's Sejanus "a 
political melodrama without a touch of the tragic" (p. 192), but Jonson himself 
defended the playas precisely what his contemporary critics would define as 
tragedy, and we cannot merely dismiss Jonson with the thought that his 
conception of literary genres was less valid than our own. The Persians of 
I lEschylus, whose tragic power Heilman denies, was in fact an important classical 
: model for tragedy among Renaissance theorists who regarded its historical 
I I subject matter as a crucial ingredient of tragedy not present in the Oresteia. 
As an exploration of man's relation to the evils of the world and those within 
himself, tragedy has always depended upon the assumptions about the world 
and about human nature held in the specific eras of its creation. The supreme 
tragedies were for many centuries considered to have been the fall of Lucifer 
and the crucifixion of Christ, and the tragic power of literary works could be 
,I measured by the extent to which they might be analogous to these cataclysmic 
disasters. Neither could be considered a tragedy in Heilman's frame of reference; 
since they involve protagonists totally evil or totally good, they must be classed 
as melodrama. It may well be that the kind of tragedy which emerged in 
ancient Greece could not be created either in the Christian Renaissance or in 
our own age of skepticism and spiritual malaise. A truly satisfying conception 
of the genre may have to find room for all of its historical variations. 
Many will object that Heilman confines tragedy too narrowly within indi-
vidual character, morc a nineteenth century concern than it had been in earlier 
times, when the individual was considered worth examination only as a symbol 
of the universal state of mankind. There is a long tradition of tragic writing, 
308 BOOK REVIEWS 
stemming from the medieval morality play and de casibus narrative which must 
be viewed in these terms. A criterion for tragedy based entirely upon char-
acter which finds The Maid's Tragedy and A Woman Killed Witb Kindness more 
truly tragic in structure than Tbe Duchess of Malli Of The White Devil (although 
imperfect as tragedies because of other limitations) may be entirely too narrow 
for our needs. A limiting of tragedy to struggle within the soul of individual 
man may do little justice to the crucial political dimensions of plays like Julius 
Caesa1' and Coriolanus (neither of which Heilman sees as fully tragic), and it 
does cause Heilman to slight the tragic power of Ricbard II, where Richard's 
suffering is not merely aroused by the injuries he has sustained but springs also 
from a tragic awareness of his own violation of the responsibility placed upon 
a lang by God. 
What Heilman defines as tragedy will be accepted as such by most intelligent 
readers. They may regard it, however, as merely one kind of tragedy. They may 
argue that H a17llet may be a tragedy about a victim of evil who learns to over-
come evil, just as Macbeth may be a tragedy about a doer of evil who is 
destroyed by what he has created, and that it is the final effect upon the 
audience, rather than the extent of the protagonist's guilt, which finally deter-
mines whether a work may be called a tragedy. The innocent no less than the 
guilty may be subject to moral conflict and impossible choice. If the effect of 
tragedy is a heightened awareness and understanding of the general human con-
dition and an insight into the infinite complexity and contradiction of human 
life, many readers will argue that these ends have been achieved by works other 
than those that Heilman would describe as tragedy, including many which he 
would call melodrama. He might well reply that the line of separation between 
these two "versions of experience" must finally be drawn by each. man for 
himself. 
State University of New York 
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IRVING RIBNER 
The Lonely Labyrintb: Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Works by Josiah Thomp-
son. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967. Pp. 242. $8.50. 
Following his own lead, most of Kierkegaard's commentators have sought the 
single" point of view" from which his works might be understood and evaluated. 
Josiah Thompson's new book continues this tradition. 
The Lonely Labyrinth elaborates the suggestion that "IGerkegaard was a 
profoundly sick man, and that the character of his sickness established a privileged 
perspective for the understanding of his work." In the light of this thesis, his 
"works tum out to be, not abstruse theologico-philosophical treatises or mysteri-
ous aesthetic essays, but successive moves in a complicated dialectic of therapy." 
(p. xiii) They are" efforts ... to find not trutb but health." (p. 16) Part One 
of Thompson's book sketches the biographical, psychological, philosophical, and 
literary background of Kierkegaard's authorship. Part Two-the major division 
of the book-offers more or less detailed readings of the pseudonymous works 
from Eitber/Or through Concluding Unscientific Postscript. 
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Thompson's thesis has its virtues (of which more in a moment), but it also 
raises a number of questions. A nation's concern with its own health presumably 
justifies another painstaking reconstruction of six fatal seconds in Dallas. But 
if Kierkegaard was a sick man who wrote books to cure himself, why should l-
Of anyone-be interested in the diagnosis or the treatment? Thompson's answer 
seems to be that Kierkegaard's disease is endemic to all of us. He suffered from 
consciousness itself, more specifically from the "fissure between self and world 
which consciousness requires." (p. 46) 
It is by no means obvious that the subject-object distinction is or engenders a 
universal human affliction. It may be only a modern fad, the "existential" sick-
ness, just as consumption used to be the "romantic 1) way to die. There have 
been generations of men who did not literally suffer their consciousness. Even 
IGerkegaard allows that there is a healthy condition of consciousness and (pace 
Thompson's etymology, p. 13) a bappy passion of reason, the condition and the 
passion of faith.1 
But let that pass. Suppose consciousness is a universal disease. Thompson 
insists that "IGerkegaard is finally uninterested in the formal characteristics of 
any dialectic that might be extracted from his authorship .... He is no verbal 
architect constructing an edifice of language to encapsulate the real, but a 
suffering human being searching desperately for health." (p. 208) If this was his 
purpose, why did he write, polish, and publish a whole shelf of books? He did 
in fact go out of his way to construct a "verbal edifice" built in accordance 
with a meticulously thought-olit literary dialectic. Yet if his only object was 
therapy, surely the infonnal journals would have sufficed. Thompson's thesis 
maI{cs irrelevant Kierkegaard's life-long preoccupation with the dialectics of 
communication, his labors over the production of his books, and his careful 
attention to the details of their publication. 
My criticism is not directed against Thompson's thesis in particular. His 
approach to IGerkegaard is a welcome relief from the usual clerical exegeses that 
try to put Kierkegaard into one or another religious camp (radical Protestant, 
covert Catholic, or~most recently Jl~a sneaky kind of Dunker). It permits him, 
for example, to discern the essential perversity in Kierkegaard's late writings, 
where most theological interpreters are committed to finding the soul of Christian 
piety. And within the limits of his thesis he has done some of the most original 
and sensitive readings of the pseudonymous works to date. He is alert to the 
symbolic and archetypal values of IGerkegaard's books as few Kierkegaardians 
have been. Many of his interpretations depend, often successfully (though 
occasionally less so because of inattention to context), on minute analysis of 
linguistic and stylistic features of the works. At his best he reads the works, 
whereas most commentators read at them. For its treatment of individual works 
and passages, and quite apart from its overall thesis, Thompson's book (the 
cliche is inevitable) deserves to be read by every serious student of Kierkegaard. 
Yet the thesis does limit Thompson's openness to IGerkegaard. It obliges him, 
for example, to confound the pseudonyms with each other and with the author 
1 S¢ren Kierkegaard, Tbe Sickness Unto Death (New York, 1954), pp. 147,262; 
Philosophical Fragments (Princeton, 1962), p. 67. 
2 Vernard Eller, Kiel'kegaard and Radical Disciplesbip: A New Perspective. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. 
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of the Edifying Discourses (cf. pp. 110, 112, 116), and to undervalue the literary 
and philosophical plenitude of the pseudonymous works (cf. pp. 73, 150, 151). 
Ex bypotbese the pseudonyms are projections of Kierkegaard, and the works, 
for all their apparent variety, are so many tactics in a single strategy of self-
treatment. There is one author, one problem, and one book written many times 
in diverse manners. (pp. 19, 164) 
The inseparability of form and content, a commonplace of modem criticism, 
was a matter to which Kierkegaard gave much thought. He saw himself as a 
philosopher and a poet, a philosopher only insofar as he was a poet; in all his 
writings he strove to make the form "reduplicate" the content.a How it is pos-
sible to rewrite" the same book in different ways" (p. 164) is no clearer to me 
than it was to Kierkegaard. But the point is essential to Thompson's argument; 
as his book progresses we get more schematism (works appear from Klerkegaard's 
pen to illustrate and confirm Thompson's thesis) and less reading of the worI{s 
themselves. Kierkegaard may have been a sick man. But he was also a more-
than-usually self-conscious literary artist. His artistry deserves to be honored 
for itself, not merely as an incident in his therapy. 
The issue, I repeat, is not Thompson's thesis in particular. As theses go, it is 
as good as many and better than most. My criticism is more general: Thomp-
son's book gives us a new point of view on Kierkegaard, but what is needed in 
IGerkegaard literature is precisely not another point of view, new or old. If you 
come to Kierkegaard's works with a point of view, you inevitably read not the 
works but the reflection in them of your own determinations. Kierkegaard called 
himself" a peculiar kind of poet and thinker." 4 Anyone who will read his works 
aright must read them thoughtfully and poetically. The student of Kierkegaard 
must endeavor to understand with imaginative impartiality all the points of view 
expressed by all the Kierkegaardian pseudonyms and by Kierkegaard himself in 
propria persona, each in its own right and for its own sake. Each is one per-
spective (a bias, in fact) on the many-faceted whole of human life; none is 
the simple and entire truth. Not even the optimum statement of his views, which 
Kierkegaard gave direcdy and without guile in the Edifying Discourses, ex-
hausts the possibilities for human self-understanding or offers the reader a 
decision ready-made for his case. The works are possibilities which the reader 
must appropriate imaginatively in order to corne at last and passionately to his 
own personal actuality That is part of what IGerkegaard meant when he said 
that he had no opinions of his own, no advice to tender, and no relationship to 
his own works save that of a reader. 
Kierkegaard was a poet because he was a man of almost unlimited negative 
capability, so much so that (Thompson is right about this) it nearly drove him 
mad. He demands of his reader, not the infallible point of view, but the capacity 
to cultivate multiple perspectives, a capacity that poetry requires and which in 
turn the study of poetry can help to develop. There may be, as Thompson 
says, "no deep secret concerning IGerkegaard's use of pseudonyms" (p. 73), 
:I IGerkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript (Princeton, 1941), pp. 67-74, 
312-322. 
41bid., "A First and Last Declaration," (unpaged = p. 554); also IGerkegaard, 
Preface to "Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays" in For Self-Examina-
tion and Judge for Yourselves! (Princeton, 1944), p. 5. 
BOOK REVIEWS 311 
but there is an important literary and philosophical truth behind it. IGerkegaard 
understood that angelic objectivity is not available to finite minds. Every human 
being is more than a little prejudiced, and no man can hope to disarm all his 
presuppositions. In such a predicament, the closest approximation to objectivity 
is poetry. By enlarging lUs imaginative sympathies, by cultivating as many 
perspectives as he can, a man is less likely to be the victim of his own idio-
syncratic bias. We cannot tell it like it is, we can only tell the many ways it 
might be. The profusion of metaphor is the best we get this side of the Beatific 
Vision. That was the point in Kierkegaard's use of pseudonyms. Truth is bigger 
than any or all of Qur lopsided little truths. Best, therefore, not to chase some 
will-o-the-wisp of literal objectivity; better exploit all the options than be the 
slave of one. That kind of subjectivity is truth. 
Fashions in criticism come and go, but no student of . literature believes that 
he must decide II for," say, Donne, and" against," say, Keats. Both the meta-
physical and the romantic are viable and valuable modes of imagining. Yet 
philosophers have, at least since Descartes, been hung on the over-simple 
dichotomy of True and False. If you are with Kant, you must be against Aquinas. 
Kierkegaard's gift to philosophy was the recognition that philosophical thought 
is not the firming up of Absolute Truth, but the imaginative exploration of the 
possible toward the enrichment of human self-understanding and the enabling 
of human decision. In other words, poetry. His own works demand to be read 
as a peculiar kind of dramatic poetry, of which the ultimate author has created 
not only the characters but the very poets. To read them from a new point 
of view, however cleverly devised and heavily documented (Kierkegaard like 
the Bible can be quoted on behalf of any interpretation), will of course turn 
up new aspects of their meaning. But it will also, by depreciating the medium, 
deface the message. To read them without a point of view, or (which is the 
same thing) from all the points of view they themselves suggest, is, like the 
criticism of literature, an unending task. But that was exactly what their author 
had in mind, whose declared intent was not to propose a new system of phi-
losophy nor to contrive new techniques for self-therapy, but "to read solo 
the original text of the individual human existence-relationship, the old text, 
well known, handed down from the fathers-to read it through yet once more, 
if possible in a more heartfelt way." Ii 
LOUIS H. MACKEY 
The University of Texas at Austin 
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